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Los timoratos, los pobres de espíritu y los mediocres prefieren
siempre los pequeños proyectos. Las naciones grandes, como
la nuestra, con grandes aspiraciones e ilusiones, deben tener
también grandes planes. Nada grande puede hacerse proyectan-
do pequeñeces, y por eso nuestro plan concreta una gran ilusión
que acariciamos los argentinos.1
During his time in office (1946-1955), Argentine president Juan D. Perón
extolled the virtues of comprehensive state planning –entrusted to technical
experts in federal bureaucracies and guided by himself, the Conductor– as a
tool for social and economic modernization. Perón was, of course, not alone in
envisioning national progress in these terms, as countless political regimes
experimented with state planning throughout the twentieth century. Faced with
the crisis of World War I, European states mobilized their populations and eco-
nomic producers as never before. In the war’s aftermath, Soviet officials
endeavored to create a socialist civilization by applying state planning on an
ever-grander scale, beginning with the New Economic Policy (1921) and First
Five Year Plan (1928). From these origins as a wartime and revolutionary
measure, state planning evolved into an accepted feature of modern statecraft.
The ideal of technical coordination by national government was integral to
attempts at steering a third-way between the extremes of Soviet socialism and
laissez-faire liberalism, as exemplified by European fascism. Likewise, the
developmentalist ideologies of the post-World War II era emphasized the
application of social scientific expertise and centralized organization by the
state in the “Third-World.” 
1 Perón (1985: 8, 222), noviembre de 1946. 
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Scholars are in the process of reevaluating the significance of state plan-
ning as a major facet of twentieth-century world history. Studies have focused
on the types of social knowledge that provided state officials with new tech-
niques for governance and sources of authority. Rather than seeing planning as
a path to national liberation, most recent works have stressed the authoritari-
anism of technocratic rule, which worked at cross-purposes with democratic
politics and facilitated the forced relocation of populations, genocides, and
state terror that marked the past century.2 Within the field of Argentine history,
the state has become a topic for greater scholarly attention in its own right,
motivated partly by a desire to understand the evolution of bureaucratic power
in the twentieth century. Thanks to studies by Patricia Berrotarán and others,
we now have a more complete account of the intellectual origins and institu-
tional precursors to Perón’s own Five-Year Plans.3 Authors have traced the
history of individual government agencies (especially during the 1946-1955
Peronist administrations), as well as the negotiations between state planners,
business elites, and military officials, among others.4
This essay considers the political history of planning in Argentina as a way
of understanding the origins of Peronism in a new light. In particular, it chal-
lenges the tendency of recent studies to equate state planning too narrowly
with technocracy, that is, with an impulse among highly-trained government
officials to assert their autonomy and remove themselves from the political
process. Indeed, historians have gone to the extreme of viewing planning in
opposition to politics (what James Ferguson’s study of developmental policies
termed the “anti-politics machine”); or at best, they consider it a restrictive
political paradigm imposed from above by state officials on unwilling sub-
jects. To be sure, this technocratic impulse is a common feature of twentieth-
century states. But the history of planning in Argentina (as elsewhere) should
not be limited only to the analysis of government institutions and experts, as
important as these subjects are. This essay will investigate the broader politi-
cal dimensions of planning in Argentina during the critical historical conjunc-
ture of the Second World War and its aftermath. As we shall see, state planning
was a subject that attracted intense debate and political coalition building
among non-governmental actors, including social scientists, labor unions, and
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2 The most far-ranging analysis of “high-modernist” planning is provided by: Scott
(1998). Other key works in this vein include Ferguson (1994); Holston (1989); Prakash
(1999); Rabinow (1989); Robertson (1984). 
3 Berrotarán (2004); Berrotarán and Villarruel (1995).
4 Recent works on the authoritarianism of the Argentine state include, Pucciarelli (ed.)
(2004). For studies of the Peronist state, see Ballent (1993); Ross (1993); Gaggero /
Garro (1996); Novick (1986). 
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business organizations. Moreover, planning occupied a prominent role in pop-
ulist politics during the justicalista era and figured in Peronist strategies to
court a mass political following.
A particular combination of international and domestic factors came to
bear during the early 1940s that contributed to the fervor over state planning in
Argentina. The eruption of the Second World War in September 1939 raised
fears that Argentina would fall prey to yet another international economic cri-
sis, either during the war itself or in the transition to an unknown postwar
order. This anxiety was coupled with optimism among sectors that wished to
alter Argentina’s liberal order and a growing willingness to consider state
intervention in socio-economic reform on a national scale. Postwar planning
encompassed a wide range of opinions on different policy issues: industrial
protection, social insurance, public works, scientific research, labor legisla-
tion, energy and natural resource development, technical education, and
national defense, to name but a few. 
Given this diversity of motivations, it is not surprising that state planning
was conceived of in multiple, often clashing, ways during this wartime con-
juncture. By exploring the shifting boundaries of “planning” as a subject of
public contention, this essay situates the rise of Perón’s political movement
within the context of pre-existing debates over reforming the Argentine state.
At its core, state planning represented a paradigm of modern governance, in
which social scientific knowledge and techniques would be used to rationalize
state institutions. Its advocates were concerned primarily with augmenting the
power of the central state to regulate economic activity and to manage the
social needs of the population.5 While many warned against “excessive” state
intervention, planning discussions contained an implicit critique of Argentine
liberalism’s agro-export economy and limited state social programs. Yet many
of those involved in these wartime debates also envisioned planning more
broadly as a process of coordinating interactions between state and non-state
authorities; in this view, government officials would create institutional chan-
nels to tap the expertise of professionals (engineers, economists, architects,
etc.) and representatives of major economic interests (industrialists, agricul-
tural producers, etc.) in formulating policies. For some, this coordinating func-
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5 This broad definition of planning calls to mind Michel Foucault’s notion of “govern-
mentality,” which he used to describe the state’s assumption of a whole set of manageri-
al duties and forms of knowledge. Foucault suggests that the role of the central state has
become increasingly to ensure the full, efficient exploitation of national resources,
including the maintenance of a healthy and productive population. Burchell (1991: 87-
104). For the intertwined histories of social science and state planning, see Rueschemey-
er / Skopol (eds.) (1996). 
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tion of planning meant creating corporatist structures modeled on fascist Euro-
pean regimes. As this essay will suggest, the politics of planning in Argentina
were marked by this tension between the exclusivity of technocracy and the
desire for greater coordination among social forces.
In addition to examining these wartime negotiations over postwar plan-
ning, the essay sheds light on one of the institutional and discursive founda-
tions upon which Peronist mass politics was built. Perón and his advisors made
great efforts to convince supporters of the power of central state planning. The
Peronist regime followed in the paths blazed by the propaganda-makers of fas-
cist Europe, as well as foreshadowing the mass mobilizations of other Third
World planning states. As this essay will suggest, the Peronist vision of a “New
Argentina” was based, in part, on an appeal to the authority of technical elites
to manage socio-economic forces. Much of the scholarship on Peronism –and
more generally, on populism in Latin America– has tended to downplay the
influence of “scientific” discourses in favor of other factors. Perhaps this lack
of scholarly attention can be attributed in part to the ascendancy in recent
decades of a neo-liberal variant of technocracy across Latin America, which
seeks to shield policymaking authority from popular politics. But as the case
of Peronism in the 1940s makes clear, the cult of the populist leader and the
technique of planning could also exist in complementary fashion to one anoth-
er, although not without friction.6
This essay explores how Perón and his advisors reworked policies, organi-
zational structures, and reformist discourses to develop a distinctly Peronist
version of planning. It begins with a look at the origins of “postwar planning”
as a topic for public discussion during the war years. The second section con-
siders the way that Perón both forged alliances and alienated members of this
loose community of postwar experts, and the third offers an overview of the
role of planning in mass politics during Perón’s presidency. My objective is
not to trace the institutional history of planning organizations, analyze the
policies of Perón’s regime, or investigate how popular sector Argentines inter-
acted with the planning state, all important subjects treated by other studies.
Rather, this work examines planning for insights into the emergence of new
state practices and political discourses in postwar Argentina. By drawing com-
parisons with other cases, including European fascist regimes, the essay places
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6 In more recent times, politicians such as Salinas de Gortari in Mexico have combined a
neo-liberal variant of technocratic planning with a so-called “neo-populist” appeal. It
would be worth exploring how the decade of Menemista rule in Argentina represented a
similar hybridization. For historical and contemporary perspectives on Latin American
technocracy, see Knight (1998, 223-48). Centeno / Silva (eds.) (1998); Dornbusch /
Edwards (1991); Pucciarelli (ed.) (2004).
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the Argentine experience within global historical trends, while illuminating
the particularities of how Perón and his counterparts addressed the promise of
planning. 
Envisioning the Postwar
Across the Atlantic World, the Second World War catalyzed the expansion of
the structure and scope of central government. Among the belligerent powers,
the demands of mobilizing populations for war intensified the state’s coordi-
nation of national production and other key macro-economic concerns, as well
as generating expectations of postwar social reform. Almost from the war’s
very start, groups within Argentina began to consider how central government
could not just reduce temporary economic disturbances, but also pursue more
ambitious strategies for national progress in the transition from war to peace.
This period witnessed the rise of coalitions that were brought together for the
first time under the umbrella of postwar planning. Although in the end these
tentative alliances collapsed or were swept aside by the Peronist movement,
early reform advocates played a crucial role in setting the parameters of post-
war planning –in the process, creating precedents that were seized upon by
subsequent political actors.
Postwar planning drew upon vibrant social and economic policy debates
from the 1920s and 1930s. Individuals who participated in Argentine reformist
circles came from diverse professional backgrounds and included social scien-
tists, religious authorities, journalists, politicians, and labor activists, among
others. These actors clustered into numerous intellectual communities, often
centered on respective policy journals, political parties, or organizations (such
as the Museo Social Argentino).7 For all their ideological differences, many of
this period’s prominent figures –Alejandro Bunge, Juan Cafferata, and Enrique
Dickmann, for example– reached the common conclusion that the state was
responsible for addressing the shortcomings of laissez-faire liberalism, above
all, the risks faced by workers from illness, substandard housing, and unem-
ployment in an unequal society.8 In addition, a newly trained generation of
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7 Key journals included the Revista de Economía Argentina, Revista de Ciencias
Económicas, and the Boletín del Museo Social Argentino. Political organizations such
as the Partido Socialista also acted as key sources of communication and helped forge
contacts between intellectuals, social scientists, and activists.
8 The issues raised by reformers remained within the basic parameters of the “social ques-
tion” from earlier in the century; the moralistic language employed by turn-of-the-cen-
tury “hygienists” had not completely disappeared, and some commentators continued to
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social scientists drew attention to macro-economic problems, above all, to the
balance between industrialization and the traditional agro-export economy. In
developing their thoughts about the national state’s role, Argentine reform
groups paid close attention to experiments with planning and social politics
occurring elsewhere in the Atlantic World. Following patterns established dur-
ing the heyday of nineteenth-century liberalism, the traffic of ideas flowed
mostly one way, from “cutting-edge” progressives in Europe or the United
States to their Latin American counterparts; information about the latest social
and economic policy innovations arrived to southern shores in the 1920s and
1930s, helped along by correspondence with foreign experts and international
conferences. This openness to international influences did not mean that
Argentines were simply mimicking foreign examples, and trans-Atlantic com-
parisons did not preclude careful observation of specific social conditions in
Argentina.9
As they looked abroad for comparisons, Argentine reformers across the
ideological spectrum encountered numerous examples of state planning in
action. In Italy, planning was closely associated with the creation of corpo-
ratist structures to bring labor and business under the aegis of the state; the for-
mation of Italian corporatism began prior to the worldwide depression, but
intensified in the early 1930s with the expansion of the Ministry of Corpora-
tions and major corporatist legislation in 1934. Hitler’s rise to power was
accompanied by the growth of German state control over business and labor
relations, motivated mainly by the regime’s ideology of national coordination
and militaristic expansionism.10 But not all versions of interwar planning were
associated with authoritarian politics. In the United States, the New Deal
offered a collection of social programs and Keynesian-inspired economic poli-
cies that provided another model of planning for progressives. The impact of
the New Deal among liberals could be seen in Britain’s own Beveridge Plan
(1942), which promised more wide-ranging, progressive reforms to the social
insurance system and other welfare programs. These moderate reforms to lib-
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rail against social danger, criminality, and degeneracy. Zimmermann (1995); Suriano,
(ed.) (2000); Panettieri (ed.) (2000). 
9 For a path-breaking look at this traffic in ideas, see Rodgers (1998).
10 For the purposes of this essay, corporatism is defined in narrow institutional terms as
structures for economic management implemented by European fascist regimes, in
keeping with a corporal metaphor of hierarchical representation and critique of liberal-
republican politics. Paxton (2004); De Grand (2004: 47-62). Throughout mid-twentieth-
century Latin America, governments (including Perón’s) sought to apply certain corpo-
ratist policies, but stopped short of creating formal institutions along fascist lines to
coordinate between business and labor. The Brazilian Estado Novo represented perhaps
the most comprehensive of these examples. Erickson (1977). 
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eralism generated wide enthusiasm, but there was no shortage of observers in
Argentina (including social scientists) attracted to the corporatist organization
of business and labor.11
Despite the frustrations of many reform advocates at the slow pace of
change in the 1930s, especially on the social front, the Argentine national gov-
ernment did expand its regulation of the macro-economy over the decade. The
Uriburu and Justo administrations pursued fiscal policies to defend the liberal
model of agro-export economics from the shocks of the Great Depression,
including the creation of new institutions such as the Central Bank in 1935 and
boards to assist large agricultural producers. This trend continued through the
outbreak of the Second World War, as Argentina’s liberals proposed measures
to protect their nation from new disruptions in the world economy. The first
major reply to fears of wartime instability came in November 1940, as Presi-
dent Ramón Castillo presented to Congress the Programa de reactivación de
la economía nacional, better known as the Plan Pinedo after its author, Trea-
sury Minister Federico Pinedo. The Plan Pinedo consisted mostly of financial
reforms designed to assist agricultural producers, create a more vibrant credit
market, and bolster the beef and grain export economy. To save the liberal
orthodoxy of free trade and comparative advantage, the Plan Pinedo proposed
a series of unorthodox measures that expanded the regulatory power of the
central state, including a proposal for state assistance in housing construction.
For all of its efforts to chart a moderate course of intervention, however, the
Plan Pindeo was ultimately rejected by Congress.12
Yet the Plan Pinedo’s demise served, paradoxically, to intensify discussions
of state planning in Argentina. The frustration of Pinedo’s project (and his sub-
sequent resignation from office in 1941) created an opportunity for other actors
with alternative social and economic agendas to debate the course of national
progress and devise plans of their own. In the process, “planning” was detached
from the immediate interests of government officials focused on setting
wartime policy and became more broadly associated in the early 1940s with
civil groups that explored the transition from war to peace. With their attention
focused on the task of “preparing for the postwar,” social scientists and busi-
ness organizations occupied the terrain vacated by the federal government.
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11 Fondness for corporatism could be seen in the writings of mainstream social scientists
such as Alejandro Bunge and his circle. Bunge (1940).
12 Ministerio de la Hacienda (1940). As Juan José Llach has convincingly argued, this fail-
ure of this planning proposal resulted mainly from deep partisan conflicts over federal
interventions in provincial governments and electoral corruption –and not intrinsic
opposition towards Pinedo’s economic strategies. Llach (1984: 515-57); Pereyra (1995);
Cramer (1998: 519-550)
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In the aftermath of the Plan Pinedo’s failure, the Unión Industrial Argenti-
na (UIA) took the lead in creating an organizational framework for postwar
discussions. The UIA established the Instituto de Estudios y Conferencias
Industriales in 1942 to serve as a forum to exchange information about press-
ing social and economic topics. The Instituto’s executive council and contribu-
tors included social scientists, factory owners, and military officers (typically
civil engineers and directors of military-run factories, such as Colonel Manuel
N. Savio). In May 1943 the UIA formed another organization known as the
Congreso Permanente Para Estudio de los Problemas de Post-guerra y de la
Economia General del País, which soon thereafter became the Congreso Per-
manente de Fuerzas Productoras. This larger group included hundreds of
members drawn from ranks similar to those at the Instituto, but also brought
together representatives from powerful commercial and agricultural institu-
tions such as the Sociedad Rural Argentina and Bolsa de Comercio.13
The Instituto and Congreso were advisory boards that sought to educate
Argentines about both the dangers and the prospects of the postwar. Gather-
ings were open to the public and reached a broader audience through the pub-
lication of pamphlets and occasional radio broadcasts; judging by the level of
the discussions, however, these efforts were aimed mainly at an educated pub-
lic that included government officials, policymakers, and businesspeople.
Aside from the few military officers, participants in the UIA’s organizations
came from outside the government, and as a result, these bodies had no author-
ity to determine policy directly. Membership was restricted to professionals
and experts in economic and social affairs interested in moderate changes to
the status quo. Political and civil groups that might upset the delicate centrist
balance –such as labor unions, leftist parties, and the extreme right– were
specifically excluded.14 Nevertheless, postwar organizations opened new
channels of communication among individuals from the disparate worlds of
the academy, industry, and the military. 
In addition to these organizations, the work of postwar preparation was
carried out in a handful of specialized journals, in particular the Revista de
Economía Argentina (REA). Alejandro Bunge, the founder of this monthly
magazine, had published works since the 1920s on the issues that now con-
cerned would-be planners. His book Una nueva Argentina (1940) argued
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13 Revista de Economía Argentina (REA) May 1943: 175-77; Oct. 1943: 416-17. 
14 Torcuato S. Di Tella offers insights into his father’s role in the Instituto and the tensions
produced by including experts from various professional and ideological backgrounds.
For the sake of some semblance of ideological balance, the rightist catholic economist
Alejandro Bunge, for instance, was paired with his more left-leaning counterpart Ricar-
do Ortiz. Di Tella, Torcuato Di Tella (1993: 119-20 and 126-38).
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forcefully for state action in industrialization, social welfare programs, growth
of domestic consumption, and more efficient economic management. Bunge
continued to stress the virtues of these policy goals in the pages of his maga-
zine, and he was joined by likeminded engineers and economists who shared
his social Catholic ideology. The REA reprinted articles published on postwar
problems in newspapers such as La Nación and reported faithfully on the
activities of the UIA’s organizations. Bunge himself participated in the Institu-
to committees as an expert on industrial policy. Like the Instituto, the REA
acted as a clearinghouse for technical knowledge on socio-economic policy,
while also serving as a vocal advocate for postwar planning in determining
government priorities.
The REA and UIA organizations remained open to policy examples that
reached Argentina from abroad. By far the most discussed foreign models for
Argentine planning were Roosevelt’s New Deal, the United States’s National
Resources Planning Board, and above all, Britain’s celebrated Beveridge
Report. (Mentioning the “Plan Beveridge” became de rigeur in policy discus-
sions throughout the 1942-1946 period.) Most social scientists and other
would-be planners considered Argentina to be confronting socio-economic
problems common to “modern” nations. In an April 1944 article “Anteproyec-
to de plan economico argentino para la posguerra” published in the REA, engi-
neer Francisco García Olano asserted that the age of laissez faire was over, as
witnessed by the different planning measures taken by Russia, Germany,
Japan, and the United States after the crash of 1930. Olano concluded that
political leaders needed to come to terms with the demands of modern times:
Hoy en guerra y mañana en la paz, todos los países deberán planificar sus
economías, para mantener la producción, o adaptarla a las nuevas necesidades; ase-
gurar una justa distribución de los productos, aumentando el consumo y mejorando
el standard de vida de las masas, evitando y eliminando la desocupación.15
The diverse experts who participated in the UIA’s conferences and com-
mittees exchanged views, but failed to agree on coherent policy directions.
The differences of opinion on the issue of state support for industry –the most
debated issue in planning circles– are suggestive of the distances that separat-
ed them. For Bunge and his peers at the REA, the central state was considered
a force for diversifying industry and boosting the cycle of domestic employ-
ment, production, and consumption. By contrast, military officers concentrat-
ed on the importance of developing heavy industry and mining to defend
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national independence. Luis Colombo, the UIA president, looked to the state
to protect existing Argentine industries in the turbulent transition from war to
peace. 
There were similar tensions concerning what actions the state should take to
guarantee social peace in the postwar transition. Torcuato Di Tella became the
leading voice within the UIA for moderate reforms to improve the living condi-
tions of industrial workers. In 1939, he represented the UIA at an International
Labor Conference in Geneva; on a 1943 trip to the United States, he gathered
additional information about New Deal programs and postwar planning, even-
tually drafting his own proposals for a national social insurance program and a
“family wage” subsidy scheme.16 Other participants in the UIA planning activ-
ities made similar declarations about the need to uplift and protect working-
class families, but the actual commitment to social policy was limited at best.
Colombo peppered his speeches with references to the New Deal and Bev-
eridge Report, and at an April 1943 conference he asserted that his organization
wished to protect workers “desde la cuna hasta la tumba” from life’s risks.17 Yet
under Colombo’s leadership, the UIA lobbied against Socialist-sponsored con-
gressional proposals for a minimum wage and for expanded labor legislation.18
After years of opposition or indifference to these sorts of projects, the UIA’s
sudden embrace of social welfare seemed like a gesture intended to win support
for the more pressing goal of industrial protection. 
UIA postwar planning, then, was an uneasy marriage between different
interest groups and sources of expertise. Qualms about wartime collapse co-
existed with a sense of possibility, and this optimism manifested itself in
numerous ways. Reform-minded social scientists saw the potential to create
social insurance and other programs that would shelter the growing urban pro-
letariat from economic forces. Industrialists and their supporters envisioned
greater state protections for local manufacturing. Argentina’s exposure to
crises imported from foreign shores convinced anti-imperialist critics –among
them members of the military– of the virtues of economic nationalism. Under
the auspices of planning organizations, these agendas mingled and established
a common ground for discussion. Participants expressed deep concerns over
the nature of state intervention in the Argentine economy and society. For a
minority of these observers, coordinated planning entailed the formation of
corporatist institutions at odds with liberal parliamentary democracy.19 Yet the
main concern for most UIA “planners” was politically pragmatic, namely that
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17 REA May 1943: 176.
18 La Vanguardia 27 Sept. 1942: 1. 
19 Bernardo (1945: 47-52).
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those with business and social scientific expertise take the leading role in
determining the future course of national development. Virtually all these
advocates warned against excessive “intervencionismo” from the state in pri-
vate sector affairs. “Planning” was seen as a process of coordination between
the state, business, and other forces, rather than top-down state dirigisme. 
For many of those involved, postwar planning discussions were a way to
exert influence on policymaking, in essence to prevent a model of closed tech-
nocracy from emerging. Yet even the most conservative sectors involved in
these debates acknowledged that the central state would ultimately ensure that
postwar proposals would not be confined to the conference hall and policy jour-
nal alone. In the 1943-1946 period, however, controlling the aspirations of state
officials would prove more difficult than Colombo, Di Tella and their peers
could have imagined. Perón and his allies would make postwar planning an
integral part of their model of statecraft and their brand of populist politics, thus
hastening the isolation and eventual collapse of earlier planning experiments.
Peronist Planning
On the morning of June 4, 1943, a military coup planned by a secretive club of
young officers and led by General Arturo Rawson overthrew President Castil-
lo. Between June 1943 and June 1946, Argentine politics revolved around
these military officials and their internal wrangling for control of power
(Potash 1969: 182-200; Rouquié 1982). The leaders of the June Revolution
saw themselves as the nation’s stewards, the only force that could cleanse
Argentina of its political ills and impose a new order based on respect for reli-
gion and the patria. At the same time, military officers promised to create a
more rational system of governance that would end what they perceived as the
corruption of traditional politics. Colonel Juan Perón emerged unexpectedly
from within this military regime as a high-profile advocate for the application
of technical expertise in the remaking of the central state. By the end of the
1943-1946 period, Perón had incorporated the discourse of postwar planning
into his rapidly expanding political movement and oversaw the creation of
government planning institutions. Perón’s involvement had a polarizing effect:
while he succeeded in incorporating social scientists, military officers, and
industrialists within his coalition, this support was by no means complete, and
he was drawn into open conflict with business organizations such as the UIA. 
The June Revolution regime began by engaging in new types of state man-
agement, intensifying the trend established by Pinedo and others in the 1930s.
These reforms included a reorganization of existing federal departments and
the establishment of agencies, including the National Industrial Credit bank to
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aid domestic manufacturing and the Instituto Nacional de Prevención Social
to rationalize the nation’s limited retirement system. With their emphasis on
issues such as industrialization, infrastructure, and social welfare, these insti-
tutions addressed concerns raised in the ongoing postwar planning debates.
Notwithstanding these institutional reforms and the rhetorical attention given
to the ideal of technical expertise, decision-making power within the regime
was shaped by the constant internal struggle among the military conspirators. 
From his headquarters at the National Labor Department, Perón worked to
secure a place for himself within the military government and devise his own
vision of a new state. Péron’s path from a military conspirator in June 1943 to
president three years later is, without a doubt, one of the most well-traveled
roads in Argentine historiography. Yet scholars have only recently begun to
explore the origins of the Peronist movement in relation to wartime debates
over state intervention and planning (Berrotarán 2004; Berrotarán and Villar-
ruel, 1995). The question facing historians is a basic one: how did this army
officer with virtually no experience in government become by 1946 Argenti-
na’s most famed advocate for socio-economic reform and state planning? Tra-
ditional accounts have typically emphasized Perón’s own dynamism, especial-
ly his ability to transform the moribund Labor Department into a center for
political activism. While the impact of Perón on this agency seems clear, much
less attention has been given to how this institution, its staff, and its sources of
social knowledge framed Perón’s outlook on the problem of postwar planning.
In the course of his “education” as a postwar planning advocate in the
1943-1946 period, Perón depended upon a series of intermediaries that acted
as bridges between the political power of the military regime and different
social actors, including those involved in ongoing policy debates. The most
famed intermediaries were labor union leaders drawn into contact with the
Labor Department (elevated under Perón to a Secretariat). Through negotia-
tions with organized labor Perón refined his social agenda by incorporating
longstanding union proposals for health and safety regulations, wage con-
tracts, social assistance programs, and the like. Union officials such as Atilio
Bramuglia and Angel Borlenghi, who would later hold posts in the justicial-
ista administration, occupied important positions as interlocutors between
unions and government agencies. 
Likewise, the Labor Secretariat’s staff served to connect Perón to forms of
social knowledge that would prove crucial in designing technical strategies for
governance.20 The central figure in these interactions was the Secretaría’s chief
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SEBASTIANI  10/4/06  09:59  Página 144
of statistics, José Miguel Figuerola y Tressols. In his native Spain, he had
helped to draft a national labor code and served in the fascistic Primo de Rivera
regime’s labor ministry. After emigrating to Argentina in 1930, he established
himself rapidly among social scientists, serving on the board of the Revista de
Ciencias Sociales and the Instituto de Política Social of the Universidad de
Buenos Aires. In 1933 Figuerola was appointed to a post at the Departamento
Nacional de Trabajo (DNT). He complemented his official work by writing
pieces for a social policy journals (including Bunge’s REA) and publishing a
book that expounded his own corporatist philosophy, which called for the insti-
tutional integration of government, labor, and business in Argentina.21
Figuerola proved an invaluable source of social scientific knowledge to
Perón on a host of pressing policy issues. In addition to publishing his own
works in policy journals, the DNT’s Chief of Statistics had devoted much of
the late 1930s and early 1940s to gathering extensive information on working-
class life. Under his guidance, the DNT carried out detailed surveys of the
workplace, housing, and spending patterns of Buenos Aires workers. Many of
Figuerola’s studies focused on household consumption, plotting the changes
over time in the budgets of the “typical” working family (a male unskilled
industrial worker, wife, and two or three children). In the absence of regular
censuses, these were the most sophisticated, and in some cases, the only social
surveys performed in Argentina during this period. More importantly, these
reports created Argentina’s first statistical definitions of minimum need –in
essence, a semi-official “nivel de vida.”22 The analyses of these budgets made
it possible to assert with the rigor of statistical authority one conclusion: the
average worker could not meet his household’s minimum needs. Charts com-
pared the condition of Argentine workers with their counterparts in Europe
and the USA, allowing one to gauge just how much Argentina trailed
“advanced” nations. 
With Perón’s appointment as head of the DNT, Figuerola’s policy and sta-
tistical expertise was called upon to new ends. In a 1966 magazine interview,
Figuerola described his first meeting with the colonel: “We began talking at six
in the afternoon. He wanted to see my files, to look at socio-economic statistics
and graphs of standard of living curves for the last 12 years. We exchanged
ideas and drank many cups of coffee and smoked dozens of cigarettes.” The
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21 Figuerola (1943); (1939: 83-87); Page (1983: 68-69).
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meeting finally ended at 2 in the morning, with Perón taking home a stack of
charts on the nutritional deficiencies of working-class families.23 Placing aside
the question of the accuracy of this recollection, Figuerola’s story sheds light
on how his expertise helped shape Perón’s perception of society and its prob-
lems. Figuerola’s surveys and projects exemplified the types of social knowl-
edge and technical authority deployed by military officials like Perón in their
experiments with state planning. The notion that trained officials could, through
careful observation and a rational organization of central government, trans-
form society became a central tenet of the Peronist vision of modernization. 
This model of planning would reach its greatest heights in the 1943-1946
period in a new institution created by the military regime, the Consejo Nacional
de Posguerra. Established in June 1944, this government advisory board was
entrusted with devising strategies for limiting the disruptive effects of the war and
charting the nation’s economic and social path in the transition to peace. Reflect-
ing his growing prominence within the regime, Perón was appointed president of
the Consejo, and Figuerola was named as its main “technical advisor.” Like the
UIA’s Instituto, this agency included experts from various branches of govern-
ment (including the military), social scientific community, and private industry.
The Consejo was structured around a set of “subcomisiones técnicas” staffed
mainly by military officers, civilian bureaucrats, and social scientists, above all
those who contributed to the REA, such as Rafael García Mata, Emilio Llorens,
and Carlos Moyano Llerena. A few prominent industrialists also participated in
the Consejo’s “Subcomision Informativa Patronal,” including Torcuato Di
Tella.24 With this mix of members, the Consejo represented an achievement for
advocates of greater cooperation among state, business, and social science. In
practice, however, this planning board soon replaced the UIA’s organizations as
the main institutional forum for developing postwar policy. Although busi-
nesspersons had a place on the Consejo, they now occupied a secondary position
to officials like Perón and Figuerola within the military government.25
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In 1945, the Consejo published a report titled Ordenamiento Económico-
Social that offered a public overview of its recommendations. The main prior-
ities for the postwar, the Consejo maintained, were to prevent the collapse of
wartime industrialization and to ensure full employment for the workforce. In
discussing the postwar transition, the report drew parallels with the economic
slump, inflation, and unemployment that occurred after World War I. To avert
this catastrophe, the Consejo highlighted the importance of protecting domes-
tic manufacturing, both as a way to prevent unemployment and to spur future
growth. It called for government intervention to create new industries, train
the workforce in technical skills, and diversify production in rural areas devot-
ed to monoculture. In contrast to the Plan Pinedo, export agriculture occupied
a notably reduced role in this postwar economic model. Reflecting the influ-
ence of Perón’s growing ties with organized labor, the Consejo’s report dif-
fered most significantly from earlier postwar discussions in its emphasis on
state social and economic management. The “primordial” goal of the state’s
“economic-social ordering,” according to this document, was to “secure the
satisfaction of all the needs of the country’s inhabitants, without tolerance for
the unjust concentration of resources in the hands of a few.” In practical terms,
this meant not only full employment, but also a comprehensive social security
system. Citing the famous phrase of British progressives, the 1945 report
claimed that the postwar government would protect Argentines’ “desde la cuna
hasta el sepulcro” against the risks of illness, injury, unemployment, and old
age. While warning against excessive “statism,” the Consejo maintained that
the state had a duty to arbitrate labor conflicts and establish a more “humane”
system than the “hard rules of supply and demand.”26 
Representatives from Argentina’s business community lent initial support
to the Consejo’s talk of “socio-economic ordering,” but by mid-1945 business
organizations viewed Perón’s strategies for postwar planning with increasing
trepidation.27 Perón’s call for greater state support of industry had sparked the
interest of many UIA members, including a minority faction that supported a
more thorough integration of the organization under the central state. A few of
these industrialists, such as Miguel Miranda and Rolando Lagomarsino, would
break off from the skeptical majority of their peers and eventually occupy cab-
inet posts in Perón’s government. Nevertheless, the UIA’s leadership joined
ranks with the anti-Peronist block in the campaigns leading up to the 1946
elections. Not surprisingly, the UIA and other business sectors exerted dimin-
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ishing influence in the postwar planning board under Perón’s command; the
Instituto faded away by 1946, as did the participation of its members in organ-
izations created by the June Revolution government. In the process, the Con-
sejo Nacional de Posguerra increased its autonomy in formulating postwar
policy, becoming less a forum for exchanging opinion than a tool for officials
within the national government. 
This strained relationship between Argentina’s largest industrialist organi-
zation and Perón represents an extreme case of a political dynamic common to
mid-twentieth-century planning experiences. In the case of Fascist Italy, for
instance, corporatist planning entailed constant negotiation between conserva-
tive business sectors seeking to maintain control over the operation of their
enterprises and fascist technocrats (above all, Minister of Corporations
Giuseppi Bottai) who advocated more extensive state command over econom-
ic activity. Business-owners feared invasive state regulation and the potential
for labor mobilization under fascist command. Most historical works on the
subject conclude, however, that in the end the largest Italian industrial and
commercial groups were able to adapt successfully to the era of national plan-
ning, relying on the fascists to break up labor unions while making the most of
new corporate structures to create protective cartels. Mussolini’s pragmatism
as a political leader, shaped by his need to build alliances between fascists and
conservatives, tilted the balance towards a preservation of the established
bourgeoisie (Sarti 1971; Adler 1995; Maier 1988: 3-19 and 545-578; De Grand
2004: 47-56). In Germany, Brazil, and the United States, key business sectors
were also able to reach tense, if for some quite profitable, accommodations
with state planners, although not without some sacrifices of their autonomy
(Barkai 1990: 243-249; Erickson 1977).
There are multiple explanations for the more open level of conflict between
the UIA and Perón in the crucial 1946 conjuncture. The most important factor
was, of course, Perón’s increasingly strong alliance with organized labor. As
numerous historical studies have noted, state support for unions contributed to
Argentine business organizations’ distrust and eventual opposition of Perón.
Moreover, Perón’s failed efforts to court business under the banner of postwar
planning occurred at a moment of relative political weakness; although his pop-
ularity was on the rise, Perón’s victory in the 1946 election was not a foregone
conclusion. In the case of Italy, Mussolini attempted substantive corporatist
reform only after he had built alliances with business organizations and once he
had consolidated his own power. Perón was a relative latecomer to postwar
planning discussions, and his ability to exert control over the Consejo Nacional
de Posguerra may have alienated some of those involved in pre-existing
debates over the postwar transition. Timing no doubt played a major role in
Argentina. The shift toward greater state intervention in other cases occurred
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typically after a major economic shock. While Argentine business groups
feared postwar disruptions, they were in a favorable position compared to their
contemporaries in fascist Europe and the United States during the early 1930s.
As with their counterparts elsewhere in the Atlantic World, industrialists
and other Argentine businesspersons were able to adapt eventually to new eco-
nomic policies created by Perón’s planners. Capitalists established new busi-
ness organizations in the 1946-1955 period, such as the Confederación Gene-
ral Económica, that sought greater communication with the state. Yet the
difficult relationship between organizations such as the UIA and the Peronist
regime early on had a lasting influence on the Peronist model of state plan-
ning. In contrast to corporatist systems, state-business negotiations occurred
largely outside formal institutions that allowed policy input from the private
sector.28 Under Perón, Argentine businesspersons were unable to follow the
example of their Italian peers in turning planning organizations into tools for
creating cartels and clamping down on labor militancy. The lines of communi-
cation opened in the early 1940s among industrialists, social scientists, and
military officers had become restricted by Perón’s electoral triumph, and they
only partially and slowly reopened during his presidency. Debates over post-
war planning had been marked by a tension between an ideal of state technoc-
racy and an ideal of coordination between the public and private sectors.
Despite the tentative efforts of Perón and some capitalists to build more for-
mal coordinating institutions, his regime’s version of planning relied heavily
on the autonomy of the central state –and above all, its executive branch– to
determine the future of postwar Argentina.
Planning and Populism
Over the 1946-1955 period, the Peronist administration’s First and Second
Five-Year Plans became powerful emblems of the commitment to state plan-
ning on a national level. Perón held fast to the conviction that what Argentina
needed was strong executive leadership unencumbered by public debate or
vigorous parliamentary politics. As with other protagonists of the 1943 June
Revolution, Perón’s militaristic sense of nationalist duty and anti-imperialism
found common ground with arguments in favor of forceful state intervention
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to manage Argentina’s resources. At a basic level, the concentration of deci-
sion-making authority in the executive and a small group of advisors repre-
sented a continuation of earlier political patterns in Argentina.29 Nevertheless,
Perón’s government expanded the power of central bureaucracies, extended
the reach of the national government into the provinces, and implemented a
vast, if somewhat disorganized, program of social and economic reforms
aimed at creating a “New Argentina.” 
But state planning in the Peronist era was not simply a matter of new poli-
cies and institutions. “Planificación” was also a key element in the regime’s
brand of populist politics. Rather than remaining a topic for a small coterie of
experts, planning became the subject of intense propaganda campaigns that
further infused public life with the metaphors and imagery of state-led
progress. Although an elitist when it came to exercising state power, Perón dif-
fered from his predecessors in his efforts to communicate this ideal of state
planning to a wide audience. Perón and his assistants invoked repeatedly the
scientific, rational virtues of planning to justify their actions. In the process,
they blurred the lines that had traditionally separated matters of public policy,
government institution building, and mass politics in Argentina. While the
political discourse of planning does not alone explain the popular appeal of
Perón as a leader or the power of his political movement, it did form an impor-
tant part of the Peronist ideology of national progress and social justice. Plan-
ning thus had a profound impact in the sphere of mass politics. 
Throughout his early political career, Perón drew on terminology used in
postwar planning debates. In his hundreds of speeches, radio addresses, and
published texts produced during the 1943-1946 period, Perón made the social
scientific language of planning a more familiar feature of mainstream politics.
For instance, at an assembly of commercial retail workers gathered in Decem-
ber 1944, Perón defined for his audience what he called the “English” term
“línea de vida”: “Este consiste,” explained Perón, “en el equilibrio del sueldo
o jornal con las necesidades mínimas de la subsistencia en condiciones dig-
nas.”30 The government’s main responsibility, he contended, was to prevent
the working population from being “sumergidos” below this line or minimum
“standard de vida.” By incorporating “foreign” concepts into his speeches,
Perón defined social justice in the international language of social science.
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(That the “línea de vida” and “standard” were identified as English suggests
his audiences’ at least partial unfamiliarity with these terms.) In addition to
explaining his new terminology, Perón offered a summary of the state’s mis-
sion in the postwar:
Es elemental obligación del Estado moderno el propugnar por todos los medios
la existencia de un “standard de vida” adecuado para todos los habitantes, el que
estará en razón directa con la economía nacional y el trabajo individual y con una
organización adecuada del país, que permita llegar a la más perfecta coordinación y
el máximo equilibrio económico-social.31
Here, as in countless other descriptions, the language of planning –“stan-
dard de vida”, “organización,” “coordinación,” “equilibrio”– seeped into Per-
onist descriptions of social justice and national progress. Echoing the pro-
nouncements of the Consejo Nacional de Posguerra, he maintained in
subsequent public addresses that the central government needed to exert a
“una función rectora y reguladora” to guarantee harmony in the postwar tran-
sition.32 Perón reinforced these claims by telling audiences that foreign leaders
in “cultured countries” already realized that the state needed to soften the
clashes between labor and capital.33 From this perspective, class conflict was
not a permanent condition, but could be resolved by rational government inter-
vention. Perón used the metaphor of society as a motor with many sets of
gears, in which the state should act as a mechanic: regulating the flow of
national resources, restraining chaotic market forces, and ensuring an equi-
table distribution of material rewards among the social classes.34
It is important to note that Perón’s descriptions of the science of state plan-
ning existed side-by-side with other appeals. Perón spoke in many accents at
once: in the same speech, he incorporated the rhetoric of Catholic morality,
union solidarity, leftist class struggle, and popular colloquialism, to name but a
few. More to the point, Perón’s pronouncements about the power of the state
were juxtaposed with statements designed to convince audiences of his own
personal authority; it was only through his guidance that state planning would
deliver real improvements to the everyday lives of Argentina’s population. The
concrete social reforms supplied by the Peronist government and the alliances
brokered with unions –topics treated at length by this period’s labor histories–
lent his descriptions of a “New Argentina” added weight. In institutional and
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policy terms, this first generation of Peronists grafted the Secretaría’s social
agenda onto the Consejo Nacional de Posguerra’s projects. But unlike other
postwar planners, Perón did not speak exclusively in the language of technical
expertise. Often in the same speech, he switched from exalting the science of
state planning with to descriptions of anti-bureaucratic and personalist govern-
ment. He distinguished the Secretaría from typical government bureaucracies,
with what he once called their impersonal “technical-administrative mecha-
nisms.” The Secretaría was instead “the true house of workers,” a protective
space where dedicated officials served the laboring man and woman with
empathy.35 It was through this interplay between discursive appeals and mate-
rial rewards that Perón crafted a new sense of the politically possible, ground-
ed in the science of state planning and charisma of populist leadership. 
The first Plan Quinquenal epitomizes this confluence of planning and pop-
ulism. Presented to Congress in October 1946, the Plan was at one level a pol-
icy statement comparable to the Plan Pinedo or similar proposals from the
1930s and 1940s. Its original focus was setting industrial policy, and the Plan’s
main architect, José Figuerola, addressed the key concerns of the UIA’s Insti-
tuto and the Consejo Nacional de Posguerra, such as the need to protect exist-
ing industries, ensure adequate supplies of energy and raw materials, and fur-
ther industrialization across the nation. Over the first few months of Perón’s
presidency, additional projects were added to the Plan Quinquenal before its
presentation to Congress in October 1946, and the Plan covered issues ranging
from public health and education to transportation and a restructuring of the
state. Modern government, as Perón explained in his congressional speech
introducing the Plan, required an orderly division of tasks: “el estadígrafo va a
exponer la situación, el estadista dará los objetivos y el técnico ha de indicar el
camino para alcanzarlos.”36 As with his predecessors, Perón stressed the
importance of social scientific knowledge to gain an objective picture of
national economic problems and social conditions. In 1947, the federal gov-
ernment carried out a new national census –the first in nearly thirty-five years–
to gather the necessary statistical information with which to guide planning. A
new agency, the Secretaría de Asuntos Técnicos, was created to oversee the
Plan and to coordinate among the various branches of federal government,
with José Figuerola as its first director.37
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Policy experts –including those who had participated in postwar debates–
greeted the Plan Quinquenal with mixed opinions. The contributors to the
Revista de Economía Argentina supported the Plan Quinquenal and claimed
that Perón’s speeches echoed earlier reform discussions: “muchos de los con-
ceptos enunciados coinciden substancialmente con la predica constante del
ilustre inspirador de esta revista, Prof. Alejandro Bunge y que han seguido sus
discípulos”. They felt that despite some lack of specificity, the Plan provided a
good roadmap for government action that could be improved “a la marcha.”38
Other social scientists responded more critically, either by noting the incom-
pleteness of Peronist planning or attacking its excessive state interventionism.
The Revista de Ciencias Económicas published articles between 1946 and
1949 that focused on the government’s surge in public spending and heavy-
handed economic interventions. José Gonzalez Galé, one of Argentina’s lead-
ing experts on social insurance programs, pointed out that the regime’s “caja
de jubilación” system was financially unsound and unfairly burdened employ-
ers; in his opinion, the Peronist state’s frenzied expansion of social programs
would create new problems of coordination.39
Yet Perón was not preoccupied primarily with these policy experts. Rather,
the Peronist government focused its efforts on convincing the Argentine public
of the merits of the Plan Quinquenal and its model of state-led modernization.
The regime made great pains to project an image of state planning that was at
once technical and that exalted the ideals of social justice and national libera-
tion. Indeed, the Plan presented to the public was a generalized version suited
to a mass audience, complete with flowcharts and other visual aids. Peronist
officials used every state, partisan, and media channel at their disposal to
spread word of the Plan Quinquenal. Pro-government newspapers such as
Democracia carried almost daily reports on the various issues addressed by
Plan, and the federal government printed and distributed thousands of copies
of the Plan for public consumption. The President himself offered a week’s
worth of conferences on national radio in October 1946 during which he
recounted chapter-by-chapter his government’s five-year objectives. He met
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as well with representatives from organized labor to request their assistance in
educating the rank-and-file about the Plan. An advertisement published in the
Unión Ferroviaria’s newspaper captures the general tone of these propaganda
efforts, in particular the ways that planned progress and mass politics became
intertwined under justicialista rule: 
Industrializar el país, poblarlo, enriquecerlo, asegurar para todos sus habitantes
condiciones de existencia decentes y normas de vida dignas, a tono con el progreso
social que acusan los países más adelantados. El Plan Quinquenal ha de materi-
alizar aspiraciones tan legítimas. ¡Apóyelo!40
Visual representations were fundamental to these propaganda efforts. Posters
plastered on walls across the country offered symbolic depictions of how
planned government and technology were transforming the nation. One such
poster used the metaphor of a cauldron of molten metal being poured into an
Argentina-shaped mold to illustrate the impact of the Plan Quinquenal: industri-
al technology was forging a new nation.41 Pamphlets and magazines provided
images of the Plan being put into action –of housing projects and hospitals under
construction, gas pipelines being laid down, workers enjoying their “standard of
livings”, and bureaucrats hard at work in new public buildings. Statistics and
charts were often included to provide social scientific evidence that would quan-
tify how Perón and his government were delivering on their promises.42
The fundamental goal of this propaganda was to educate and even dazzle
the populace with the grandeur of planning in action. At their core, these efforts
were also designed to foster a sense of solidarity between state authorities and
supporters at the grassroots. Indeed, propaganda-makers encouraged Argentine
men and women to participate with their government in the Plan’s realization.
This argument may appear counter-intuitive at first glance, given the elitism
generally associated with the technocracy of state planning. Yet the idea that
the “pueblo” could cooperate with the president and his experts lay at the heart
of the regime’s attempts to convince the public that they were not mere subjects
of the state, but part of a dynamic and unified partisan movement. Exactly what
“cooperation” meant in this context was, to be sure, a thorny problem, and there
were few institutional channels within the structures of the Peronist govern-
ment for individuals to influence policymaking directly.43
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Especially after 1949, the regime intensified its drive to transform society
into Perón’s ideal of an “Organized Community,” where the “masses” would
be integrated within a pyramid of work, party, and social institutions with the
president at the apex. Once again, Perón’s militaristic ideal of an ordered
nation found common ground with a conception of planning as scientific man-
agement of society. In partisan manuals such as Conducción Política (1952),
the president invoked the authority of planning in a more abstract, symbolic
sense: “en la conducción política, si no tiene un plan, no se hace nunca nada
racional y bien hecho.”44 Stripped of its narrow technical meanings, the “Plan”
became a key metaphor within these partisan attempts to preach the mystical
gospel of “conducción.” By the early 1950s, the model of planning as “socio-
economic ordering” established during the war years became coupled to this
idea of planning as the “Organized Community.” This broadening of planning
into mass politics manifested itself in stricter state control of the media, a
crackdown on political dissent, and the formation of new partisan organiza-
tions (such as the Partido Peronista Femenino). 
For the regime’s many critics, the application of planning metaphors to polit-
ical and social organization was a clear sign of Peronism’s status as “fascismo
criollo.” Without engaging in a detailed analysis of the comparisons between
Peronism and fascism, one can readily see that these political movements did
indeed share a critique of liberalism, authoritarian repression of opponents, and
a desire to apply the latest techniques of modern statecraft to reorder the nation.
Yet there were also notable differences in how European fascist regimes and
Perón’s government made political use of planning, differences that anti-Pero-
nists either did not see or chose to ignore in order to achieve their more pressing
goals. In the Argentine case, for instance, state planning was part of a nationalist
vision that fully embraced the idea of modernization, rather than emphasizing
the need to restore lost traditions and regenerate a degraded society, as was often
the case in fascist regimes. Perón’s rhetoric of the “Organized Community” dif-
fered from Mussolini and Hitler’s in the absence of an exaltation of a mythic
past before liberalism, in which collective, organic representation held sway.45
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Although these regimes often employed similar propaganda techniques in
regards to the planning state, there was wide variation in the party, government,
and labor institutions called upon to organize and mobilize political support.
Complementing the familiar comparison with interwar fascists, Perón can
also be seen a precursor to subsequent political attempts in the postwar period
to harness the power of planning in the “Third-World.” As the wave of decolo-
nization swept through Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean, national planning
became increasingly divorced from its European goals of protecting pre-exist-
ing industrial capacity or limiting the effects of depression and war. Within the
context of decolonization and the emergence of developmentalist ideologies,
state coordination of economic activity became a means to spur industrializa-
tion and break free from traditional colonial strictures. From Nehru’s India to
Nasser’s Egypt to Nkrumah’s Ghana, national planning in the postwar world
contained a crucial mass political dimension, as leaders sought to mobilize
their populations behind the banner of anti-imperialism and modernization. As
in Peronist Argentina, these experiments with state planning often produced
narrow policymaking elites and authoritarian restrictions of the public sphere. 
This mass political dimension of state planning can help explain in part a
familiar paradox of Peronist rule: how a regime that concentrated policymak-
ing authority in the executive branch was able nevertheless to generate such
wide popular participation. As this essay has argued, Peronist officials invoked
the authority of social science and technology in outlining their vision of post-
war progress. The regime sought to convince the Argentine public to place
their faith in the expertise of state officials and in the guiding force of the Con-
ductor. In describing the concrete accomplishments of the central state, Pero-
nist propaganda contained both these technocratic and populist dimensions. It
is valid, of course, to question the supposedly “scientific” characteristics of
the regime’s five-year plans and the degree which social scientific experts
played in actually shaping policies. (If one considers open criticism to be an
integral part of the scientific method, then certainly Peronist planning fell far
short of this ideal.) But it is also important to understand how technical expert-
ise formed part of an ideology of postwar progress, constituted by a set of dis-
courses and visual symbols, disseminated through the mass media, and articu-
lated within government institutions. 
Final Remarks
By way of conclusion, it is worth asking the question of why planning had such
an appeal in wartime Argentina. The central explanation may be that this subject
attracted the attention of UIA and Peronist groups for the same reason it did in
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Europe, the United States, and elsewhere in Latin America. Although Argentines
were not directly involved in armed conflict, they were exposed to a similar set of
risks –economic dislocation, unemployment, uncertainty– generated by the glob-
al nature of the war. Likewise, the capacious nature of postwar planning as an
activity appealed to diverse groups within Argentina, each of which brought its
own agenda to the conference table. “Planning” was a concept elastic enough to
raise the enthusiasm of those who wished to protect business activity as well as
those who sought to impose order on unjust markets. Experts and their political
allies spoke the language of postwar planning in the accents of capitalist efficien-
cy, conservative yearnings for social peace, and progressive social politics.
In Argentina, the defensive tendencies of postwar planning gave way to a
much more expansive commitment to using the power of central government
to transform society. Peronist planners in particular were able to tap into the
concerns of reformers and labor movements, who had criticized the shortcom-
ings of laissez-faire government and liberal economics in the 1930s. They
were successful in grafting the transnational vocabulary of social politics onto
popular perceptions of Argentina’s inequality and injustice. Postwar planning
played upon perceptions of Latin American backwardness and the need for
rapid, all-encompassing change directed by the central planning state. In its
Peronist variant, “governmentality” came to encompass not only management
of natural resources and the capacity of the population, but also ideological
consensus and control over political support. Although the regime was not
entirely successful in realizing its ideal of an “Organized Community,” it did
nevertheless change the political landscape of Argentina. The early advocates
of postwar reform might have been dismayed at how Perón’s political coali-
tion adapted policies, institutions, and discourses associated with planning to
new ends. But these criticisms did not stop Perón and his followers from
invoking the virtues of the “Plan,” or in making state planning a centerpiece of
bureaucratic power and populist politics in the New Argentina.
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